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ABSTRACT 
Canadian universities are considered by some in the public and private sector to 
be inefficient organizations, largely because of the inability to make decisions 
related to cost effectiveness. There is a threat to introduce other control mecha-
nisms into the decision-making autonomy of the universities. In fact, universities 
are very complex organizations and comparable with other complex systems. 
They are probably as effective in their operation as other organizations in the 
public and private sector when they are examined according to a set of criteria 
of effectiveness. They could be compared on these criteria but full data are 
lacking. In terms of their autonomy Canadian universities enjoy a greater amount 
of local decision-making than universities in many other countries. British and 
German universities, although they are quite different, achieve high standards 
without the same autonomy as Canadian universities. But are they really as 
efficient and should we allow ourselves to be pushed in the direction of control 
to which they are subject or should we resist it? 
RÉSUMÉ 
Les universités canadiennes sont considérées par certains membres des secteurs 
publique et privé comme des organisations inefficaces, en grande partie à cause 
de leur incapacité à prendre des décisions concernant l'efficacité des dépenses. 
L'introduction d'autres mécanismes de contrôle dans l'autonomie des universités 
en ce qui concerne leurs prises de décisions pèse comme une menace. En fait, les 
universiti'es sont des organisations très complexes et comparables à d'autres 
système complexes. Elles sont probablement aussi efficaces dans leur fonctionne-
ment que d'autres organisations des secteurs publique et privé lorsqu 'on les évalue 
d'après un ensemble de critères d'efficacité. On pourrait les évaluer d'après ces 
critères, mais des données complètes manquent. En ce qui concerne leur auto-
nomie, les universités canadiennes bénéficient plus du privilège de prendre des 
décisions locales que les universités de bien d'autres pays. Les universités anglaises 
et allemandes, quoique très différentes, obtiennent des résultats très satisfaisants 
sans avoir la même autonomie que les universités canadiennes. Mais sont-elles 
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vraiment aussi efficaces? Devrions-nous nous laisser pousser dans la direction du 
contrôle ququel elles sont soumises ou bien devrions-nous y résister? 
INTRODUCTION 
In spite of protestations to the contrary there is a view expressed by the public 
and by government members that universities are inefficient consumers of their 
resources. Leslie (1980) for example, reflects this when he states: 
The public authorities, frustrated by the apparent unresponsive-
ness of the "universities to exhortations and warnings to take 
their own affairs in hand and to cooperate with government in 
the pursuit of cost-control and structural change, may feel it 
necessary to subject the universities to increasingly tight and 
pervasive controls, (p. 129) 
This sentiment is also echoed by Howard Bowen (Clark Kerr, et al, 1978) and 
by the Canadian delegation report (all but one of whose members were federal 
or provincial government employees1) at a recent OECD (1981) intergovernmental 
conference which stated under the heading of "New Patterns of Authority": 
. . . . among the obstacles to improved management were the 
extreme participatory decision-making structures inaugurated 
in the late 1960's . . . . which give small groups the power un-
reasonably to block decisions that are in the interests of their 
institutions or of the system as a whole (Working Group 4, p. 4) 
Such a view of inefficient decision-making appears to be based on a limited, even 
simplistic, perception of universities. The perception may stem from assumptions 
that organizations in the private sector generally manage their affairs efficiently. 
The type of decision-making they employ is one of the major differences 
between universities and other organizations, whether they be in the public or 
the private sector. It would be legitimate, then, to ask whether the decision 
making employed by universities contributes to their efficiency or detracts from 
it and whether, on this basis, there is a case for subjecting the universities "to 
increasingly tight and pervasive controls". 
As a first step I shall outline the general structure and operation of complex 
organizations, how one determines whether or not they are efficient, and how 
universities, public sector, and private sector organizations can be compared. 
As a second step I shall make some selected comparisons between universities 
in Canada and those in Britain and Germany where decision-making is more 
centralized. 
COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 
The complexity of organizations can be measured in simple terms by their 
number of employees or clients, the amount of their operating budgets, diversity 
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of function, complexity of function, or some combination of these factors and 
others. Major Canadian universities, like other large complex organizations, 
employ a staff of 3-4-5,000 people or more; they enrol 20-30, or more, thousands 
of students; and they have operating budgets in excess of $100,000,000. The 
functions of universities include the education and training of every type of 
society's professional members and intelligensia as well as the development and 
storage of information and science; and within them are conducted the most 
complex types of analysis, research, and scholarship. They can be numbered 
among the more complex human organizations. 
All complex organizations have some form or other of bureaucratic structure. 
This is unavoidable wherever specialization and coordination is required, as in 
the training of professional students, and requires some hierarchy of command, 
however limited, with some officers being responsible for the direction and co-
ordination of the work of others. The more specialized and complex the work 
that is done in the organization, the more difficult the work of direction and 
coordination becomes for those in the hierarchy who are responsible for overall 
objectives. Given the complexity of universities this makes the work of those 
who plan, coordinate and direct the academic enterprise extremely difficult and 
makes the selection of criteria for effective operation both difficult and subject 
to challenge. Added to this is a firmly rooted tradition of peer judgment and 
collective decision-making in the Canadian university, a tradition which pre-
dates the "participatory decision-making structures inaugurated in the late 
1960's" but which that movement greatly elaborated upon and strengthened. 
In comparing universities to other organizations one might look at military 
colleges run by the Department of National Defence; at community colleges 
operated by provincial governments but with significant money available 
through the federal government; at training and research programs operated by 
federal ministries (e.g. Department of Transport); or at training and research pro-
grams operated by a small number of private organizations in Canada. 
Good comparative data on costs, outputs, and effectiveness of these systems 
is non-existent. However, it is unlikely that the universities rank at the bottom 
end of the scale in effectiveness. The universities probably stand at a higher level 
on the scale of effectiveness than the others, at least in response to long-term 
needs. Although I believe the effectiveness of my own university compares 
favorably with any military college, community college, federal ministerial train-
ing and research program, or the small number of training-research programs of 
the private sector with which I am familiar my comparison could be challenged 
if it were based solely on personal perceptions. 
INDICES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
How might one go about making such a comparison? The information and theo-
retical suggestions are rather thin, although Cameron (1978) has set out nine 
indices of effectiveness specifically for the comparison of institutions of higher 
education, and again (Cameron 1981) outlines four domains of organizational 
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effectiveness for colleges and universities to consider. Six generally measurable 
variables of effectiveness have been set out in some detail by the author else-
where.2 These six factors are: productivity, morale, conformity, adaptiveness, 
institutionalization, and stability. On the assumption that most people have a 
general understanding of three of these (i.e. productivity, morale, and adaptive-
ness) only the other three will be described. 
Conformity refers to whether or not the behavior of people within the organ-
ization complies with the ideology reflected in the rules and norms of the 
organization. In universities, the question would be whether professors and 
other members behave in such a way as to support the acknowledged objectives 
of a university. Lack of conformity would see defiance and sabotage of accepted 
norms of teaching, research, and service. Few organizations have as many of their 
members so fully and personally dedicated and committed to upholding their 
purposes and values as do universities. 
Institutionalization refers to whether or not an organization receives the 
support of the society in which it is embedded. In Canada we are getting a mixed 
review on this measurement at the moment for student applications for admis-
sions have risen in most fields and are very high in a number of technical and 
professional fields; private donations to universities are probably higher than at 
any time in history; students are willing to absorb higher tuition and incidental 
costs; private organizations and government agencies are courting us and pur-
chasing our services; yet governments have publicly whipped and threatened us 
in recent years. 
The third measurable variable is stability and it is the one that truly distin-
guishes us from private sector and most public sector organizations. The main-
tenance of stability requires universities to operate with balanced budgets, to 
maintain those programs which students and the public demand even though 
they are very costly, and to avoid disruption of programs by such things as 
strikes and lockouts which are disruptive to student progress. To maintain 
stability and prevent its own destruction during bad times in the private sector, 
an organization can raise prices, close down branch operations, lay off staff, sell 
off subsidiaries, borrow money, and so forth. In the public sector organizations 
can often count on supplementary estimates. What can universities do? They do 
raise prices modestly by increasing tuition fees, although some are not permitted 
to do so unilaterally, by charging lab fees, by selling class notes, by raising food 
prices and parking fees, and so forth. Most universities have been under serious 
constraints from constituents, clients, and governments, however, in taking these 
price increases too far or too fast. Among other things, voices of concern are 
raised that the long battle for greater accessibility to the universities would be 
curtailed by rapid rises in fees and other costs. As for closing down branch 
operations, universities find there are very few programs which can be sacrificed 
without a serious blow to quality or without producing a public outcry. Already 
the course offerings in some departments have become restricted or are available 
on an alternate year basis. We may have to go further and close down, for example, 
honours programs in many departments. Laying off staff has its special problems 
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in universities as we all know, in spite of university and faculty union declarations 
that tenure is not job security. (Governments, of course, have their own problems 
in getting rid of non-producers.) As for selling off subsidiaries and borrowing 
money from the bank, there is very little scope for the universities. 
THE NATURE OF DECISION-MAKING IN CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES 
Decision-making in Canadian universities is based on a different tradition than 
found in other public sector organizations and in private, profit-making organ-
izations. It calls for decision by vote following an open debate of the facts and 
issues by all those holding professorial rank. Although debate tended to be 
dominated in the past by senior members of the legislative body, all had a right 
to full participation and could invoke the rules of parliamentary debate in their 
defence. The long-standing practice of general faculty council, senate, conseil, 
faculty council and departmental council which employed these procedures was 
extended in the late 60's to boards of governors and other academic committees. 
The process was also declared public, open to the media, and with accessible 
minutes. Now it is not uncommon in the Canadian university to see students 
and junior members of the body fully involved in the debate, with frequent calls 
for ruling from the chair, and an invocation of parliamentary procedures. 
Procedures such as these are foreign to most organizations outside the univer-
sity. In both public and private sector, decisions on policy and its implementation 
are made behind closed doors, by senior members, without votes or recourse to 
parliamentary procedures, and with limited consultation rather than with open 
debate. 
Because of extensive public debate (sometimes reported in the press), referral 
back of committee reports to further sub-committees, split-vote decision, 
obviously divided opinion, and delay in implementation of new programs or 
policies, it may appear that the university is an overly cumbersome and in-
efficient system. 
Canadian universities are fiercely jealous of the decision-making system they 
have developed and resist any threat to it which could be construed as weaken-
ing their autonomy. Yet the financial restraints of recent years have placed 
provincial governments in a position of ambivalence as to whether they might 
intrude on this autonomy, and have left universities in an ambivalent position in 
respect to accepting seductive offers from government where it might relieve 
financial pressure. In the short run both will probably give a little; in the long 
run the odds favor government. 
OTHER UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS 
Universities throughout the Western World are currently enduring similar pro-
blems. Discussing the problems of decision-making with academic administrators 
in Canadian, British, American and German universities today, for example, 
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produces a strong sensation of déjà vu. Yet the responses to those problems differ, 
primarily because the context within which decisions are made differ. 
The very number of American institutions and the range of their diversity 
makes it difficult to stereotype the American system. Canadian, British, and 
German decision-making systems, however, give us a starting point to explore 
the issue of different styles of response to similar problems. Each can profit 
from one another's experience and in spite of the rigidities built into each 
system, each can move a bit in the incorporation of ideas from the others. 
Accepting that each university within its national system is unique, one can still 
describe national stereotypes of university decision-making. 
The Canadian systems are in the separate control of the ten provinces, there 
being no national ministry of education or its equivalent and the only coordinating 
body, the Committee of Ministers of Education of Canada sans Federal Govern-
ment representation lacking any national authority, the provinces have worked 
out unique relationships between universities and the funding agencies which 
provide 90% of their operating budgets. The Federal Government stands gnashing 
its teeth in the background claiming to have provided the greater part of the 90% 
while being an invisible non-participant in its distribution. The typical internal 
university distribution of these funds follows historical academic priorities or those 
determined through open discussion and debate in a series of sub-committees, 
senate (or general faculty council) committees, presidential advisory committees, 
the senate itself, and the board of governors. Discussion at each level tends to be 
open and is often contentious. Motions and amendments are made with recourse 
to parliamentary procedures, challenges to the ruling of the chair are made, an 
open vote is taken, and the decision is passed on to the next higher body for 
similar treatment. 
This contrasts with the British system with its flatter bureaucratic structure. 
Universities in Britain are not large hence it is possible for the astute British vice-
chancellor to maintain a flatter bureaucracy, keeping direct contact with key 
department heads while using pro-vice-chancellors and deans in a supportive but 
non-bureaucratic role. It is unlikely that the vice-chancellor will be challenged in 
committee or on the floor of senatus largely because a good amount of pre-
meeting agreement has been worked out and lines are drawn before the formal 
meeting. The placing of motions or amendments and the taking of votes is con-
sidered very bad form in most British academic settings, hence the vice-chancellor 
can "summarize the consensus" without the necessity of a vote, something 
which his Canadian counterpart could do only under special circumstances and 
only once or twice in a typical five-year term of appointment. The British 
administrative infrastructure is different, however, than one typically finds in a 
Canadian university. The vice-chancellor has frequent direct contacts with a 
range of non-academic administrators who are his supportive arms and fingers. 
In the Canadian drama these players tend to be two and three times removed in 
the bureaucracy. 
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The German system lacks the autonomy of both the Canadian and the British 
system yet is more akin the British system relative to the status of academic 
appointments and more akin the Canadian system relative a provincial-federal 
relationship. Canadian academics would be horrified to find that key members 
of the university administration were appointees of government and that perma-
nent academic staff were on the direct payroll of the government ministry of 
education. This would probably not raise British eyebrows. Yet the control of 
university budgets and development as the responsibility of the Land government 
would be as familiar to a Canadian academic as it would be alien to the British. 
There are ten Land governments as there are ten provincial governments and 
each has its ministry of education, as in Canada. The Land governments, how-
ever, have surrendered a part of their authority to a federal ministry of education 
to allow for coordination of national needs and priorities. Within the German 
system there is not the same sense of need for the type of autonomy enjoyed in 
Canada and Britain, and there is a willingness to accept that the government co-
ordinates program offerings, the government sets budgets, and the government 
sets academic priorities. It is further accepted that the kanzler, the government's 
appointee to the senior university administration, can make or influence decisions 
which in Canada would require extensive debate and formal recommendation 
through a series of committees. 
In very general terms, we might compare the three systems as follows: 
TABLE I : GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE ON THE UNIVERSITIES 
SPHERE OF INFLUENCE Canada United Kingdom i Germany 
Planning by Central 
Government NO 
MAINLY BUT NOT ! 
ENTIRELY | YES 
Appointment of Academics 
and/or Conditions of 
Appointment 
NO SOME i YES 
Central Admission o f 
Students NO SOME | YES 
Central Coordination 
of Programs SOME YES ! YES 
There are other differences, of course, but those noted are sufficient to suggest 
some directions which we might expect Canadian universities to be pressed. 
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British and German academics are as competent as Canadian academics and they 
have the same sense of personal and academic freedom. The students who are 
graduated and the services which are provided by universities in Britain and 
Germany are as good as those in Canada. Then, it may be asked, why would 
Canadian universities and Canadian academics resist centralized planning of 
university systems; government involvement in academic appointments, including 
salary ranges and benefits; the centralized coordination of student admissions; 
and the centralized coordination of academic program development? We will 
probably find many good reasons to resist being pressed in these directions but 
those who call for more control and coordination will be able to point to examples 
where government control and involvement takes place without the loss of 
efficiency. 
If Canadian academics are convinced that the decisions on planning, appoint-
ments, student admissions, and program development should remain the pre-
rogative of the individual universities, then I think they are going to have to 
make the case that the current system is at least as efficient as systems where 
there is centralized coordination or control. Right now we do not have the data 
to make that case. Using the six measures of effectiveness outlined earlier — 
productivity, morale, conformity, adaptiveness, institutionalization, and stability, 
we should be able to establish some index of effectiveness of Canadian univer-
sities. The next step would be to demonstrate that, in spite of a quite different 
type of decision-making process, the universities are as effective as other public 
and private organizations, and as effective as universities in non-Canadian 
systems. This sounds like a big task and it is, but I suspect that a good deal of 
the data already exist. Much of it has been gathered in Europe (e.g. Hecquet and 
Jadot, 1978). Until someone comes up with a comparative analysis the sugges-
tions that our universities are inefficient decision makers are going to continue, 
and accompanying the suggestions will be the threat that control and coordina-
tion of major decisions should be put into the hands of others. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 The Head of Delegation was a deputy minister of education, the Chairman of the Work-
ing Group was a provincial higher education commission chairman, and the Rapporteur 
was a provincial program director. Of the eleven Canadian participants, one was a univer-
sity president, two were from the Secretary of State, and the remainder were with the 
provincial ministries. 
2 David J. Lawless: Organizational Behavior, Prentice-Hall, 1979, p. 32-36. 
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